Somalia: Jubaland teeters on brink of conflict as military buildup escalates 

Somalia
Somali security officers take position near Syl Hotel, the scene of an al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group's attack, in Mogadishu, Somalia March 15, 2024. REUTERS/Feisal Omar

MOGADISHU (Somaliguardian) – Somalia’s southernmost Jubaland state, comprising Lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Gedo regions, now teeters on the edge of catastrophic conflict as tensions escalate between the federal government and the state’s administration, following the re-election of the region’s long-time leader for a third term on Monday. 

The Somali federal government has deployed hundreds of troops, airlifted to the strategic town of Raskamboni along the Kenya-Somalia border, claiming the move is to seize control from withdrawing Kenyan forces ahead of the expiration of the ATMIS mandate later this year; however, many suspect Mogadishu’s true intent is to expand its control in Jubaland. 

Irritated by Madobe’s bid for re-election, the Somali federal government, even before his third-term victory on Monday, appointed his former spy chief as the army’s land forces commander and airlifted troops to El Wak in Gedo region, signaling an escalation toward a potential showdown with the Jubaland leader who in the past has repeatedly outmaneuvered many federal leaders. 

Faced with two military fronts opened by the federal government—one in Raskamboni and the other in El Wak—Madobe, visibly angered and defiant in both his words and demeanor, declared that he cannot be subdued by force or intimidated by threats, insisting that only dialogue can resolve the standoff. 

Despite the over 200km distance and Al-Shabaab’s control of many key routes between Raskamboni and Kismayo, the federal troop deployment is designed to signal Mogadishu’s determination to punish Jubaland leader Madobe for his unilateral indirect election, while also serving as a strategic move to undermine his power by fomenting defections within Jubaland’s forces ahead of any potential advance on the city. 

A significant shift in the war’s dynamics is the apparent neutrality of Kenyan troops, who have long supported and protected Jubaland President Madobe; the repercussions of this shift were evident in Madobe’s victory speech on Monday, where he declared that neither Ethiopia nor Kenya could dictate his actions—an unprecedented stance, particularly toward Kenya, which has backed him for over a decade. 

The Somali federal government also initiated a minor front within Kismayo, where opposition candidate and Senate member Ilyas Gabose was elected regional president in a parallel process on Sunday; claiming legitimacy on Monday, Gabose dismissed Madobe’s re-election, while Madobe firmly declared himself the sole president of Jubaland, rejecting any rival claims. 

Madobe faces the most formidable threat to his 15-year rule, while Jubaland stands on the brink of a volatile eruption, the full scope of which remains unpredictable; despite his lack of regional support and widespread disdain from local communities, Madobe retains the backing of his clan and thousands of former Liyu Police soldiers from Ethiopia’s Somali region, whom he financially sustains to defend his rule, indifferent to legitimacy or popular support. 

Why is Somali government intensifying efforts to subdue Madobe? 

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has vowed to end indirect elections, committing to a one-person, one-vote system in 2026, while securing agreements with Hirshabelle, Southwest, and Galmudug leaders to extend their mandates until late 2025 to facilitate popular votes; however, Madobe rejected the agreement, opting instead to proceed with an indirect election. 

For President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, indirect elections have never secured a sitting president’s re-election, and given his declining popularity, he now rejects it as a viable option; however, Madobe’s successful manipulation of the indirect election process and his continued hold on power could force Mohamud into adopting a similar system in 2026, effectively undermining his ambitions for a prolonged tenure. 

While concerns mount over the feasibility of a one-person, one-vote election due to the federal government’s limited control in Mogadishu and parts of Hirshabelle and Galmudug, international partners have made it clear to President Mohamud that they will not support his preferred election model unless it gains broad consensus among political stakeholders; Madobe’s re-election through an indirect process further isolates Mohamud, as the international community—Somalia’s most powerful political stakeholder—has indicated it will not back a process lacking essential support. 

The escalating tensions in Jubaland now make war seemingly inevitable, as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud seeks to oust regional leader Ahmed Madobe and either hold a popular vote in 2025 or extend terms of regional presidents indefinitely, raising the specter of bloodshed—a prospect condemned by Mohamud during his opposition years but now embraced as a strategic means to secure his hold on power, despite the hypocrisy of repeating the very wrongs he once decried. 

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