HARGEISA (Somaliguardian) – Since Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, popularly known as Irro—a seasoned diplomat and former speaker of Somaliland’s parliament—was declared the winner of the break-away region’s November 13 election, speculation has mounted over whether he will annul the controversial sea access agreement signed by outgoing President Muse Bihi Abdi with Ethiopia in January.
According to officials from the current Somaliland government, the agreement, which is merely a memorandum of understanding rather than a formal deal, would require the breakaway northern Somali region to lease a tract of land along the Red Sea to Ethiopia in exchange for Addis Ababa’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent country.
The agreement sparked a political firestorm across the Horn of Africa and beyond, with Somalia, the de jure guardian of Somaliland but not its de facto authority, condemning it as illegal and an infringement on its sovereignty, while swiftly garnering support from neighboring Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, and other Red Sea countries.
While the agreement sparked local dissent in Somaliland, particularly in the Awdal region, where the land designated for lease to Ethiopia is located, it was largely applauded by many in the political establishment, with some, including the newly elected president, who then led Waddani opposition party, expressing cautious support and refraining from fully endorsing or opposing it.
At the time, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi asserted that the government had the right to negotiate agreements, and if the deal included recognition for Somaliland, it was a positive development; however, he noted conflicting reports surrounding the agreement and emphasized that it was the responsibility of parliament to address and resolve the ambiguities.
Unlike Bihi, a former military pilot in Somalia’s army who fought with the Ethiopia-backed Somali National Movement to overthrow Siad Barre’s military regime, Irro is a seasoned diplomat, having served as Somalia’s first consul to Moscow in the 1980s and later as ambassador to Russia.
In contrast to Bihi, who rebuffed external counsel on his decisions, Irro is an experienced diplomat surrounded by a cadre of knowledgeable and astute advisors, well-equipped to evaluate both the risks and rewards of the agreement his predecessor forged with Ethiopia.
While his stance on the agreement during his opposition days was measured, partly to avoid losing popular support in the run-up to the election, as the electorate was firmly in favor of recognition and rallied behind anyone they perceived as willing to champion it.
Irro is determined to take decisive action on the agreement, bringing it before parliament to clarify its ambiguities and eliminate any provisions that may be perceived as contrary to the breakaway region’s interests, including the 50-year land lease to Ethiopia for the construction of a naval base.
For any discerning observer, regardless of their background in diplomacy, politics, or law, it is an inherently dangerous and existentially risky proposition for a small, unrecognized region to cede territory to a vastly larger neighboring nation—especially one with a history of violent conflict and territorial ambitions—particularly when such land is designated for a naval base that could ultimately serve as a strategic springboard for future encroachment.
Since the signing of the agreement, Ethiopian officials have repeatedly asserted their claim to a sovereign sea outlet to the Red Sea, despite their landlocked status, with some even going so far as to claim ownership of Somalia’s coastlines and threatening to use any means, including military force, to achieve this objective. Furthermore, Ethiopian officials have since backtracked on their earlier statements regarding the recognition of Somaliland in exchange for the sea outlet lease.
Fully cognizant of Ethiopia’s shifting positions and the substantial risks embedded in the agreement, Irro and his team now have the opportunity to amend it in a way that safeguards Somaliland’s interests; while the new president may be willing to grant Addis Ababa access to the port of Berbera, including tax exemptions for certain offloads, he is resolute in avoiding the legacy of being the leader who permitted a hostile neighbor to militarize Somaliland’s territory, potentially setting the stage for future annexation of the self-declared republic.
In matters of diplomatic, trade, and security cooperation with Ethiopia, Irro appears set to continue the approach of his predecessors—Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, Dahir Riyale Kahin, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud Silanyo, and Muse Bihi Abdi—who consistently portrayed Ethiopia as Somaliland’s singular ally and guarantor, promoting the need for peaceful coexistence with their powerful neighbor.
It remains uncertain whether Irro will work to mend ties with Djibouti—whose economic interests were undermined by the sea access deal Bihi signed with Ethiopia, which Djibouti viewed as a threat to its port revenues—or whether he will focus on addressing the protracted disputes with Somalia’s federal government over Somaliland’s pursuit of independence and recognition, and Somalia’s stance on re-unification, leveraging his diplomatic acumen to break the decades-long deadlock, even if it requires a win-lose approach.
The more deftly Irro maneuvers through the intricate tensions of the Horn of Africa and the rising clamor of conflict, the better it will be for the breakaway region, which suffered its most tumultuous period of division and strife under the outgoing Bihi—yet only time will tell the true impact of his leadership.
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